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Thought Itself

The History of Philosophy, Logic & The Mind with Eric Gerlach

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Philosophy

Wonderland, the Looking Glass & Aristotle’s Logical Categories

I have been developing the theory that Lewis Carroll used the logical forms of Aristotle, Boole and De Morgan throughout his Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass, and both books follow Aristotle’s logical categories in reverse order as the basis for the order of events in the plots of both books, more than any other form I’ve found, and more than any form anyone else seems to have found by far, which means the books are instructional illustrations of forms of logic that are memorable and teachable to both children and adults alike.

In his Categories, Aristotle starts with what he says is the highest category, substance, and ends with the lowest, passion, but Carroll starts both books with the lowest, passion, and works upwards to substance, opposite the order Aristotle discusses them in his Categories.  In Carroll’s mirror-image order, Aristotle’s ten categories are passion, action, state, position, time, place, relatives, quality, quantity, and substance.

1) Passion: In Wonderland, Alice follows the White Rabbit out of passion and delight, with no thought as to how she would get out of the rabbit hole.  In the Looking Glass, Alice scolds the Black Kitten out of passion and anger, threatening to leave it out in the snow which would surely kill it.  Summer outside becomes winter indoors, the White Rabbit becomes a black Kitten, and the passion of delight turns to anger, all mirrored inversions, like the inverted order of Aristotle’s categories in both books.

2) Action: In Wonderland, Alice upsets the Mouse by telling him about her cat, which causes him to act and swim away from her.  In the Looking Glass, Alice confuses the Flowers, which cause them to act and mock her, and the Red Queen drags Alice with her instead of fleeing from her like the Mouse, acting on her.  The illustration of the Mouse swimming from Alice and the Queen dragging Alice are remarkably similar, and Carroll was exacting about the images, asking for several to be painstakingly redone.  Acting away from Alice turns to acting towards Alice, the single Mouse becomes the many Flowers, and Alice forgetting the small size of the Mouse turns to Alice intimidated by the Flowers that tower over her, all inversions.

3) State: In Wonderland, Alice finds herself in a useless caucus race that goes round and round in circles which mocks politics.  In the Looking Glass, Alice finds herself on a train with people who read mass printed papers and repeat popular hasty conceptions, mocking the public escalation and industrialization of culture like a train gaining speed on a track, and Alice is told she is going the wrong way by the conductor, not merely her static inverted position, but her state in motion over time.  The race round and round going nowhere becomes a train gaining speed down the line of a track, and Alice goes from uselessly going nowhere to wrongly heading down the quickening public track.

I am posting a longer post today that clarifies both lists.

Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: The Board Game

Let us imagine a game played with pieces on a board, a logistical space for moving the pieces.  What is on the board is true and certainly the present case. The pieces on the board and in the box beside the board contain all the pieces that can possibly be used, all the possibles and possibilities, such that if we see the pieces on the board and beside the board, we don’t know what pieces will be played but know all the pieces that could be played.  A piece beside the board is false and dead, unless it gets onto the board, and then it is true and live in the game, and a piece on the board is false and dead if it is taken off the board.  There are also things that are not in the game, the logical universe of discourse, the subject under discussion or consideration, and these are neither true nor false, as the are not in the cards, are not possibilities or pieces that can possibly enter the game or be negated to the side.

With this structure alone, we can exhaust all the connectives we use in formal Sentential Logic the way Wittgenstein envisioned it in his Tractatus and set it with truth tables.  First, AND puts pieces on the board, including them together, but it could also, in combination with NOT, take sets of pieces off the board, adding them to the possibilities currently false rather than those currently true.  NOT takes pieces off the board, or adds them if it is tied up with other NOTs. OR considers pieces, involved with whether or not pieces are moved on or off the board, completely indeterminate by itself, but determinate in combination with pieces added to or dropped from the board with ANDs and NOTs.

IF-THEN connects pieces possibly on the board together, such that one should lead to the other.  Sluga argues that there are connections between things in the moment, such as speciation, with all men being mortal all at once or always, and connections between things over time, such as causation, with one thing leading to another.  If the game changes with the possibilities over time, the first would be statements about the relationships between pieces at the same time, and the second different times.  Bivalence, IF-AND-ONLY-IF, would simply state the relationship is reciprocal, working both ways, which would work with speciation and causation in a chicken-and-egg situation, where two things lead to each other circularly over time, again and again.

Tiffany Versus Kierkegaard: I Think We’re Horribly Free Now

Tiffany once rigorously speculated that she thinks we’re alone now, and that there doesn’t seem to be anyone around.  Kierkegaard said God has left us wonderfully and horribly free, and we are continuously faced with the individuality of untethered existential freedom.  Both agree that there doesn’t seem to be anyone around, but Kierkegaard accepts the role faith plays in the projection of all desire, belief and action in an undefined, changing world, while Tiffany remains staunchly agnostic, refusing to say whether or not there seems to be someone around, or whether or not we individuals can achieve either faith or certainty in any way that brings us collective closure.

Is a catnap literal or metaphorical?

Let’s say that something is merely metaphorical if it is simply similar to something but not identical, as the Nyaya logicians of ancient India would say.  That means that if I act like a cat, but I am not a cat, it can be said, metaphorically, “Eric is a cat,” as I act like one, but it can’t be said literally AND truthfully that I am a cat, as said.  As Saussure the Swiss linguist could say, in French or German, the word “cat” doesn’t look like a cat or sound like a cat, nor does the word nap sound like a nap or look like one, but a catnap, a nap taken by a cat or me later, does look like a napping cat, whether or not I am a cat.  This means that when I, a human, take a catnap, I am literally taking a nap, but I am metaphorically taking a catnap.  Does this mean when I nap, “Eric is taking a catnap,” is both literally AND metaphorically true in different ways?  Can the two be complimentary, or are they exclusive?

If I am a cat, a catnap looks entirely like a cat taking a nap, and if I am not a cat, then it looks like a nap, which I am literally taking, but I am only like a cat, not actually or literally one, as said.  So: If I take a catnap with my cat, and you say, “They are taking a catnap together,” did you say something that was metaphorically true for me, but literally true for the cat, or is it both literal and metaphorical for both of us?  Does it feel metaphorical to say it about me, and feel literal to say it about the cat?  Does it feel or apply to me and the cat differently?  Does it depend how it feels to say it, or does it depend on how it is said, and to whom?  Nothing seems clear here, no matter how literally or carefully we speak.

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